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1- Introduction 
Technological progress has long been considered as a key to long-run growth (see, e.g., 
Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). While technology is 
typically protracted as one (though important) piece of production element in economic 
textbooks, in reality it is highly heterogeneous in terms of both content and level. Different 
industries can have vastly different levels of technological sophistication. High-tech 
industries such as information and communication technology, which employ the most 
advanced technologies in production, are believed by many as the key driving force of 
modern economies.  
The high-tech competition among countries is fierce. History has evidenced that at every 
stage, there is a distinct leading country which maintains technological leadership: the 
Netherlands (around 1600 to the Napoleonic wars), Great Britain (from 1820 to the first 
industrial revolution) and the US (from 1890 to present). In modern time, we have witnessed 
the competition between Japan and the US in the 1980s, and the emergence of China as a 
future challenger to the US’s hegemony more recently. 
The high-tech sector is not only important in the fighting for technological supremacy 
amongst developed countries themselves, but is also important for them to deter imitation by 
their developing counterparts. Stylized facts indicate that almost all high-tech products were 
originated from developed countries, and developing countries only get involved in their 
production at some later stage when the products become standardized and the technology 
has spilled over to them – a phenomenon known as the international product life cycle 
(Vernon 1966). Multinational corporations are traditionally a key conductor of this 
cooperative process of technology transfers. However, international production cycle could 
also be a result of unintended technology transfers, of which trade is the most important 
channel. By importing more advanced products from their developed counterparts, 3 
 
developing countries can copy or backward engineer the product designs. When the imitation 
is perfected, monopoly profits earned by the original innovators will be eroded due to their 
high labour costs. Focusing on high-tech exports is one way for developed countries to deter 
imitation as technologically sophisticated products are by nature much harder to copy or 
reverse engineer. 
As technological advantage becomes synonymous to national competiveness, countries are 
compelled to constant investment in high-tech research if they want to stay competitive 
globally. Frontier research,
1 due to its cutting edge nature, is expensive and risky. 
Furthermore, the road of turning research output into marketable products itself is also full of 
hurdles and uncertainties. As a result, how much of frontier research investment will 
precipitate into actual high-tech output is not a trivial question. Against this background, the 
first objective of this paper is to quantify the effects of research and development (R&D) in 
affecting high-tech manufacturing output. 
To quantify research efforts, the literature often uses the measure of R&D expenditure 
provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. According the Institute, the measure is defined as “… 
current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative work undertaken 
systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, 
and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, 
and experimental development.” Clearly, this measure of R&D is too broad to be relevant for 
the high-tech manufacturing sector. To address this problem, this paper proposes a novel 
proxy measure of R&D input that is unequivocally associated with high-tech: the capacity of 
                                                 
1 By frontier research, we refer to research that leads to an improvement in the state-of-the-art technology. 
Given that high-tech industries employ the most advanced technologies for their production, research in these 
industries are very much ‘frontier’ in this aspect. As a result, in this paper we use the term ‘frontier research’ 
and ‘high-tech research’ interchangeably.  4 
 
supercomputers used in a country. While this proxy measure may seem to be as bold as 
innovative, obtained results validate our choice. 
It is necessary to be upfront about the limitation of our approach. First of all, the concept of 
high-tech research is not limited to manufacturing and even in the manufacturing sector high-
tech research may not require supercomputer capacity. Moreover, the Top500 
supercomputers do not necessarily capture all the high power computing capability. 
Distributed or grid computing systems can make use of the network of a large number of 
personal computers to generate an aggregate computer capability exceeding many 
supercomputers, and this practice has been used in frontier research in various scientific 
programs (e.g. see Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC) platform). 
Here we do not intended to claim that supercomputer capacity is an ideal measure of research 
input into the high-tech manufacturing sector, but rather it is an improved proxy of such 
research input compared to the commonly used R&D expenditure measure. 
The upgrading of old products as well as the generating of new products is commonly 
considered primarily the task of the industry.  However, the role played by academic 
institutions in this process could be equally, if not more, important. Throughout history, 
universities have actively participated in many significant innovations, ranging from 
pharmaceuticals to information technology, from aero-space engineering to genetic food.
2 A 
conventional view is that industrial research and academic research are two different 
knowledge production mechanisms: the academia focuses on publications while the industry 
focuses on patentable or excludable outputs. This implies that knowledge produced by the 
academic sector is more like a public good while that produced by the industrial sector is 
mostly a private good (e.g. Stephan, 1996; Sauermann and Stephan, 2010). This view is 
                                                 
2 For example, blood preservation technology was invented by (scientists at) the University of Columbia in 
1940, liquid crystal display (LCD) by the Kent State University in 1967, and hepatitis B vaccine by the 
University of Pennsylvania in 1969. 5 
 
obviously very narrow in that many academic institutions have their outputs commercialized
3 
and many enterprises make their research findings available to the public. Also, it is 
increasingly common for universities to commercialize their research output, blurring the 
conventional border between academic and industrial research. Notwithstanding, in general it 
is reasonable to say that academic research is likely to have broader but less direct effect on 
high-tech manufacturing output, while industry research is likely to have narrower but more 
direct impact. Overall which sector has a bigger impact on high-tech output is a question 
begging for an answer. In view of this, the second objective of this paper is to test and 
quantify any impact differentials between academic research and industrial research on 
high-tech manufacturing output. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge 
it is the first empirical attempt to explain differences in high-tech manufacturing output 
across countries. More specifically, it examines the impact of high-tech research on high-tech 
output. Secondly, it explores whether supercomputing capacity (SCC) is a better measure for 
high-tech research input than the commonly used R&D expenditure. Through doing so, it 
proposes a brand new proxy for this kind of investment. Thirdly, given that existing studies 
only examine the division of Highly-skilled labour between industry and academia (e.g. 
Aghion et al., 2008; Sauermann and Stephan, 2010), this paper complements the literature by 
considering the physical capital aspect.
4 Our panel dataset has SCC measures for a number of 
segments within countries, including industry and academia. Since SCC is measured in 
processing speed, there are no price conversion issues like R&D expenditure. This therefore 
facilitates making comparisons between segments, across countries, and over time. 
                                                 
3 According to Lach and Schankerman (2003), the number of patents granted to US university scientists 
increased from 500 in 1982 to more than 3100 in 1998.  
4 We acknowledge a rich literature on the economic impacts of university and industrial research such as Jaffe 
(1989), Berman (1990), Anselin et al. (1997), Martin (1998), Goldstein and Renault (2004).  6 
 
The main findings of the paper are quite encouraging. There is robust evidence that SCC is a 
better measure of high-tech research investment than the more general R&D expenditure. It is 
found that accumulated research capital based on the SCC measurement exerts a statistically 
significant, positive impact on a country’s high-tech manufacturing output. Also, academic 
high-tech research is shown to contribute more to the growth of high-tech output than its 
industrial counterpart. Furthermore, very similar results are obtained when high-tech exports 
are used in place of high-tech manufacturing output. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model of economic 
growth with industrial and academic science. Section 3 briefly describes the methodology, 
measures and data for the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2- The theoretical model 
The final goods sector 
A representative country consists of a large number of competitive final goods producers of 
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where 
t Y  is the industry-wide aggregate output level at time t , 
t A  is the existing stock of 
general knowledge, N  denotes the fixed range of intermediate inputs used for production of 
final goods,  , it x  is the amount of intermediate capital used in industry i , and  , it q   is its 
attached quality grade. Here, 
t A  is produced through academic research while industrial 
research enhances  , it q . Capital goods are produced by specialised intermediate firms.  7 
 
The market for final high-tech consumption good is perfectly competitive. So equating the 
marginal product of a particular capital good with its price gives the inverse demand for that 
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The intermediate goods sector 
The intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive. For simplicity, we assume 
that producing one unit of intermediate goods , it x  requires only human capital and a fixed 
production factor: 
,, it it x hZ
b =                                                                              (3) 
where  , it h  is the amount of human capital employed in industry i  and Z  is the fixed 
production factor (which is normalized to 1). 
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Using this result, the final goods production function can be rewritten as:  
1 1
,1













= å  denotes the industry-wide aggregate stock of firm-specific knowledge. 
Along the balanced growth path, the fraction of human capital devoted to intermediate goods 
production is constant so that:  
() () ( 1 ) () () gY gQ gA gH aa =+ - +                                              (7) 
where  () / gX X X º &  denotes the growth rate of variable X . 
The research sector 
Knowledge production requires physical capital investment like building laboratory as well 
as human capital investment like placing researchers. Since inputs into high-tech research are 
typically highly specialized, the substitutability between physical and human capitals in 
knowledge production is expected to be very low. Thereby, for simplicity we can assume that 
the production function of high-tech knowledge takes the Leontief form. In further assuming 
no excess (i.e. wasteful) deployment of physical capital, this implies that we only need to 
account for physical capital in the production of knowledge. 
Academic research performed by universities is assumed to enhance general knowledge. The 
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where  , A t K  is physical investment devoted to academic research, and 
1
t A
g  and 
2
t Q
g  denote the 
externalities of, respectively, academic and industry R&D activities. The research inputs are 
deflated by 
tt A Q  to indicate that R&D difficulty grows as the technology becomes more 
complex.   9 
 
Industry research activities are firm specific. Each firm’s technological level is enhanced 
according to a procedure similar to the one in academia: 
12
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where  , j t k  is the physical investment in research by firm j  at time t .  
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Along the balanced growth path, 
A g  and  Q g  are both constant so that: 
  ( ) ( ) 12 () 2 ( ) 1 ( )0 A gK gA gQ gg +- +- =  (11) 
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This can be simplified into 
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Equation (14) suggests that the growth rate of high-tech output in a country is a function of 
the growth rates of its respective investments in academic and industrial research as well as 
human capital. It essentially denotes a production function expressed in terms of growth rates 
instead of levels. Even if restrictions are imposed on the parameters so that 
1 0 b >  and 
2 0 b >  based on a prior expectations, there is still no definite order between 
1 b  and 
2 b . 
However, using the equation as a platform we can empirically examine the relative impacts 
of academic and industrial frontier research on high-tech output, as explained next. 
3- The methodology and data 
3.1 The methodology 
The strategy of our empirical work, however, is not to estimate (14) straight away. Instead, 
we will first establish if a country’s SCC is a better proxy for its input into high-tech research 
than the commonly used R&D expenditure measure. Once the relevance of the SCC measure 
has been validated, we can then use it to examine the differential impact of academic and 
industrial research on high-tech manufacturing output. 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel, covering 27 to 28 countries, depending on model 
specifications. The list of countries is provided in the Appendix. As expected, the vast 
majority of the countries are OECD countries. The remaining countries are emerging 
economies, including Brazil, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Taiwan. The 
time coverage is from 1991 to 2010. 
3.2 Supercomputer capacity measures and data 11 
 
The data of supercomputer capacities of different countries are sourced from the TOP500 
project, which started in 1993 to provide a platform for tracking and detecting trends in high-
performance computing. The project produces twice a year a list of the 500 most powerful 
computer systems around the globe. The performance measure is based on the LINPACK 
benchmark by solving a system of 1000 linear equations. According to the project 
organization, “This performance does not reflect the overall performance of a given system, 
as no single number ever can. It does, however, reflect the performance of a dedicated system 
for solving a dense system of linear equations. Since the problem is very regular, the 
performance achieved is quite high, and the performance numbers give a good correction of 
peak performance” (italic original). The maximal LINPACK performance achieved by a 
supercomputer is referred to as Rmax, which has the unit of Tflops. A supercomputer that has 
a higher Rmax value is supposed to be of more powerful. We use the accumulated Rmax 
values of countries to measure their supercomputer capacity. 
An alternative measure of computing power, the theoretical peak performance Rpeak is also 
reported in the TOP500 list. According to the project organization, “Rpeak is a theoretical 
peak performance. It is determined by counting the number of floating-point additions and 
multiplications (in full precision) that can be completed during a period of time, usually the 
cycle time of the machine.” Since Rpeak is a theoretical peak performance while Rmax is the 
actual peak performance, the former is noticeably larger than the latter. We use Rmax as our 
main supercomputing power measure, but also use Rpeak for robustness check. 
The Top500 list contains a range of information about each of the TOP500 supercomputers, 
including system specifications, the major area of application, and the country and year of 
instalment. A particular important aspect of the dataset is that it stratifies the supercomputers 
not only by countries but also by segments in which the supercomputers are used. The six 
segments are respectively, academic, research, industry, vendor, government, and classified. 12 
 
Since vendors are manufacturers of supercomputers, they can also be considered as part of a 
broader industry segment. Classified segment typically consists of national security agencies 
and thereby can be considered as part of a broader government segment. The academic 
segment typically consists of universities. The research segment normally consists of national 
research institutes such as space science research institutes or medical research institutes. Due 
to this nature, it can be considered as part of a broader academic segment. In the empirical 
analysis, we will examine whether the results are robust to the aggregation of related 
segments. 
The rapid advancement of computing power is well known. This is true also for those in the 
top of the rank – supercomputers. However, even amongst supercomputers there is a wide 
range of capacity. On average, a leading edge supercomputer – known as ‘tier-0’ 
supercomputer in the industry – can stay at that tier for roughly three years. This is reflected 
in the TOP500 data as well. For example, in the June 2010 list,
6 only two out of the TOP500 
supercomputers in the world were installed in 2005, six in 2006 and 18 in 2007; the 
remaining 95% were all installed in the last 3 years. In comparison, according to the 1993 
list, only four out of the TOP500 supercomputers were installed between 1991 and 1993, all 
the rest were much ‘older’ vintages. In fact, the oldest supercomputer recorded in the 1993 
list was installed in 1984 – almost a decade ago! This temporal comparison indicates that the 
advancement cycle of supercomputing power and thus the lifespan of being a TOP500 has 
been shortened substantially in the past two decades. 
In this paper we use the accumulated SCC as a proxy measure of high-tech R&D activities 
for countries and segments. For instance, the SCC of a country in the first year, 1993, will be 
equal to the sum of the computing power of its TOP500 supercomputers in 1993. Its SCC in 
1994 will be equal to the sum of the computing power of its new TOP500 in 1994 plus its 
                                                 
6 The TOP500 list is updated twice a year. All data used in this paper are from the mid-year June list. 13 
 
SCC in 1993. Likewise, its SCC in 1995 will be equal to the sum of the computing power of 
its new TOP500 in 1995 plus its SCC in 1994. In doing so, we include the computing power 
of the supercomputers that have dropped out of the TOP500 list. This is appropriate because 
the competition of TOP500 is increasingly fierce with a lifecycle of about 3 years, but a 
supercomputer obviously has a much longer lifespan than that. We also consider the impact 
of deterioration in capacity in robustness tests.
7  
Although the TOP500 project was started in 1993, the first list contains information of 
supercomputer installed as early as 1984. However, the number of observations for earlier 
years is too small. As a result, we choose to use 1991 as the starting year (i.e. SCC from 1984 
to 1991 will be counted toward the accumulated SCC in 1991). 
Figure 1 shows the sectoral shares of supercomputer capacity of the 28 countries in our data 
over 1991-2005. Year 2005 is the latest year in which we have data for other variables used 
in the regressional analysis. For most countries, academic, research and industry segments 
account for the bulk of the countries’ SCC. However, it does not mean that the 
supercomputing capacities of the classified and government segments are negligible in 
absolute terms. Figure 2 shows the time trend of the total computing power of Top500 
supercomputers as measured by ln(Rmax). It can be seen that, there is a rapid growth of 
supercomputing capacity in all segments. Although the classified and government segments 
are of the smallest shares (so is the vendor segment), they maintain a similar growth trend as 
the other much larger segments. 
[Figure 1] 
[Figure 2] 
                                                 
7 One needs to distinguish between the depreciation in market value and deterioration in capacity. The market 
value of a computer can depreciate very rapidly. However, it does not mean that the capacity of the computer 
has deteriorated even though new software may require much bigger processing power so that older computers 
could become insufficient. 14 
 
3.3 Measures and data for other variables 
The main dependent variable in the regression analysis is the growth rate of high-tech 
manufacturing value-added. As an extension, we have also examined the impact of frontier 
research on high-tech manufacturing export growth. Data on value added and export of high-
tech manufacturing sector are extracted from US National Science Foundation’s databases.  
The five manufacturing industries constituting the high-tech manufacturing sector are: 
communications and semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, aerospace, and 
computers and office machinery. 
The figures are measured in million of constant US dollars (the base year is 2000). 
Based on the theoretical model presented in section 2, the independent variables include the 
growth rate of R&D expenditure, the growth rate of SCC, and the growth rate of human 
capital. R&D expenditure data from OECD STAN databases (2008) are used to generate 
R&D capital stocks using the method as described in Coe and Helpman (1995). The figures 
are also measured in million of constant US dollars (the base year is 2000). For human 
capital, it is highly-skilled labour that is most relevant here and thus we use the proportion of 
population with tertiary education. Data on percentage of population aged 25 and over 
completed tertiary education come from Barro and Lee (2010) database. 
4- Empirical results 
In all regressions reported in this section, the dependent variable is high-tech manufacturing 
value-added growth rate unless stated otherwise. The use of the value-added measure means 
that we have accounted for the fact that countries may import a high-tech intermediate goods 
for domestic production which itself could be of low to mid-tech nature only. 
4.1- Comparing R&D expenditure and supercomputer capacity 15 
 
We start with models using the conventional R&D expenditure measures. The results are 
reported in the first three columns of Table 1. Models (1a) to (1c) are estimated using 
respectively, the OLS, the fixed effects, and the random effects estimators. The numbers in 
the parentheses are cluster robust standard errors.
8 
[Table 1] 
The growth rate of R&D expenditure has the expected positive sign across all three models. It 
is highly significant in the OLS and random effects regressions, but not in the fixed effects 
one. However, results from the Hausman test strongly reject the hypothesis of the random 
effects model being consistent (p-value < 0.01), and the fixed effects model controls for 
country heterogeneity and therefore is preferred to the OLS model. According to the fixed 
effects model, the growth rate of R&D expenditure is not significant at any standard levels. 
The results therefore support our argument that standard R&D expenditure measures might 
not be precise enough to capture the specific, frontier research that are required for the high-
tech manufacturing sector. Highly-skilled labour measured by the proportion of population 
with tertiary education has the wrong sign but is highly insignificant across all three 
regressions.  
In models (1d) to (1f) the growth rate of supercomputing capacity is added as an additional 
explanatory variable. The SCC variable is significant at the 10% level of significance across 
three models and the coefficients are virtually identical across the three models. The OLS and 
random effects estimation results for the R&D expenditure variable are qualitatively similar 
to the previous ones, but the fixed effects estimation returns a wrong sign. But once again, 
results from the Hausman test indicate that the fixed effects model is overwhelmingly 
preferred to the random effects model. 
                                                 
8 Unobserved random shocks that hit a country at time t might also influence the country’s output at t+1, leading 
to correlated errors within countries. Using cluster-robust standard errors takes care of that. Furthermore, it is 
robust to heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson 2008). 16 
 
In models (1g) to (1i) a squared term of SCC growth rate is added to the model. The purpose 
is to test if there is a diminishing effect of SCC growth on the high-tech manufacturing value-
added growth. Results from the Hausman test continue to reject the random effects model in 
favour of its fixed effects counterpart. According to the fixed effects model (1h), not only that 
the SCC growth rate has become significant at the 1% level and its coefficient has increased, 
but also that its squared term is significant at the 1% level. 
R&D expenditure growth and highly-skilled labour growth are not jointly significant at any 
standard levels (p-value = 0.81) in model (1h). Given this, we test for the sensitivity of the 
model with respect to their exclusion. The results are shown in Table 2. All models are 
estimated using the fixed effects estimation method. Models (2a) to (2c) exclude either R&D 
expenditure growth or highly-skilled labour growth or both. All these alternative 
specifications have little effects on all other variables in terms of their coefficient magnitude, 
sign and significance. Given the robust results for the SCC growth rate and its squared term, 
we exclude the R&D expenditure and highly-skilled labour growth variables in all other 
estimations and designate model (2c) as our baseline model.  
[Table 2] 
As another type of robustness test, we experiment with alternative measures of SCC and the 
results are also reported in Table 2. In model (2d), a 5% annual deterioration rate of the 
computing capacity is assumed in the calculation of the accumulated SCC. This has little 
effect on the results, largely because SCC is increasing very rapidly over time. For instance, 
the topmost supercomputer in 2005 is of a power roughly 2300 times that of its counterpart in 
1993; as a result, unless we assume a very large deterioration rate in estimating the 
accumulated SCC it would have made little differences. In model (2e), the SCC of the 
classified segment is removed, while in (2f) the capacity of the government segment is 
removed as well. The use of supercomputer in these two segments is mostly related to 17 
 
defence purpose. Expectedly countries would try to conceal their defence technologies as 
much as possible. However, relatively less sensitive defence technologies are regularly turned 
into civilian applications. Therefore, whether defence research has any impact on high-tech 
manufacturing output growth is an empirical question. The results show that excluding the 
classified and government segments has virtually no effect on the two SCC variables. This is 
perhaps related to the fact that the two segments only account for a very small share of 
supercomputing capacity in most countries in our dataset for most of the years (referring to 
Figure 2). Lastly, in model (2g), an alternative measure of supercomputer performance, 
Rpeak, is used. Once again, this barely affects the original findings. This is expected because 
the two measures of SCC are highly correlated (correlation > 0.98). Overall, results from 
Table 2 demonstrate that the baseline model (2c) is very robust. According to the baseline 
model, when evaluated at the mean value of the SCC growth rate, for every percentage point 
increase in the growth of SCC, the growth of high-tech manufacturing value-added increases 
by 0.05 percentage point. 
4.2- Comparing the impacts of academic and industrial research 
In the regressions in Table 3 we add segmental shares of SCC to the baseline model (2c). In 
all models, the additional variables do not affect both the quantitative and qualitative findings 
for the SCC growth variables as compared to the baseline case. Notwithstanding, the results 
for various segmental shares are quite different. 
[Table 3] 
Results from models (3a) and (3b) show that increasing the SCC shares of the academic and 
research segment (relative to all other segments combined) is expected to have positive 
effects on the growth rate of high-tech manufacturing value-added. However, between the 
two only the share of academic segment is significant. On the contrary, results from models 18 
 
(3c) to 3(f) show that increasing the SCC shares of all other four segments is expected to 
have negative effects on high-tech manufacturing value-added growth. However, the shares 
of classified and government segments are not significant at any standard levels. Combining 
the academic and research segments into a broader academic segment, industry and vendors 
into a broader industry segment, and classified and government into a broader segment does 
not change the conclusions. 
While the results from Table 3 seem to suggest that research in the academic segment is more 
productive than that in the industry segment in terms of boosting high-tech manufacturing 
value-aded, the conclusion is not defined. This is because, in model (3g) for instance, we do 
not control for the effect of the broader industry segment in assessing the impact of the 
broader academic segment. Incorporating both shares into a single equation, however, is 
found to be unproductive due to multicollinearity problems – as shares of all segments must 
sum to one. To circumvent this problem, we examine the ‘substitution effects’ between any 
two segments when their combined share (or in equivalent the remaining segments’ 
combined share) has been controlled for. The results are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4] 
In all the models in Table 4, the results for the SCC growth variables remain virtually 
identical to those in the baseline model. In models (4a) to (4d), we include various ratios of 
academic and industry segments, either narrowly or broadly defined. The models also control 
for the sum of the remaining segments’ shares.  For instance, in (4a), the remaining segments 
are research, vendor, classified and government; while in (4d), the remaining segments are 
classified and government only. Results from all four models indicate that after controlling 
for the shares of other segments, substituting the share of academic segment for that of 
industry segment, either narrowly or broadly defined, will have a positive impact on high-
tech manufacturing value-added growth. The finding therefore supports the hypothesis that 19 
 
frontier research in the academic segment has a bigger impact on high-tech manufacturing 
production than frontier research in the industry segment. 
In models (4e) and (4f), we test the ‘substitution effects’ between respectively, academic and 
government segments, and industry and government segments, all broadly defined. However, 
there are no statistically discernible effects between these two pairs of segments. 
4.3- Impacts of frontier research on high-tech exports 
As an extension, we re-do the estimation after replacing value-added growth with export 
growth as the dependent variable. The impact of frontier research on high-tech export itself is 
a worthwhile topic given that high-tech exports are where advanced economies’ comparative 
advantage lies. The main results are reported in Table 5. 
[Table 5] 
All the models are estimated using the fixed effects estimator, except for (5c) which is 
estimated using the random effects estimator. At the outset it is not clear if we will get similar 
results as the growth rates of the two have a very small correlation coefficient of 0.125 only. 
Notwithstanding, the results turn out to be qualitatively very similar to those for value-added 
growth. Model (5a) includes once again, both R&D expenditure and Highly-skilled labour 
growth, but the former is of a wrong sign despite being highly significant and the latter is 
highly insignificant. In model (5b) we estimate the same baseline model as for value-added 
so we can compare their results. The results are qualitatively similar to those in (2c). In 
particular, the growth rate of SCC has a positive coefficient while its squared term has a 
negative one, signalling diminishing returns. The random effects model (5c) yields similar 
estimations to (5b), but result from the Hausman test rejects it in favour of the fixed effects 
model. Results from models (5d) and (5e) show that research in the academic segment also 
has a bigger impact on high-tech export growth than research in the industry segment, either 20 
 
narrowly or broadly defined. Lastly, results from models (5f) and (5g) indicate that there are 
no statistically discernible impact differentials between the broader academic and government 
segments, or between the broader industry and government segments. The strong similarity 
between the findings for value-added growth and export growth despite their low correlation 
goes some way strengthening our confidence in drawing conclusions from the whole 
analysis. 
Overall, our empirical findings suggest that while frontier research as proxied by SCC has a 
statistically significant impact on high-tech manufacturing value-added, there are impact 
differentials between different segments of high-tech research. It was found that input into 
academic research has a statistically discernible, stronger effect on high-tech manufacturing 
value-added growth than that into industrial research. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this finding. Firstly, knowledge produced by universities is much more of a 
public good than that produced by industrial firms where their results are not often made 
public. This public good nature of academic research and its resulting positive externalities to 
the private sector (knowledge spillovers) stimulates technological innovations and leads to 
higher productivity. Secondly, academic research helps create human capital in the form of 
Highly-skilled labour which is more likely to create technological innovation. 
The above findings obviously should be interpreted with caution due to the proxy nature of 
various measures and other data limitation. Furthermore, due to data limitation, we did not 
control for highly-skilled labour input in individual segments.  
5- Conclusion 
High-tech is widely regarded as the crown of industrialization and the key to long term 
national competiveness. As such ‘wisdom’ taking hold, stakeholders will expectedly start to 
enquire if any policy can be put in place to boost the nation’s high-tech sector. The notion of 21 
 
high-tech however, turns out to be too malleable and too fast changing to be pinned down by 
statistics precisely. When the object cannot be clearly defined, it is not quite clear to what 
extent it matters, not to mention what needs to or should be done about it. As succinctly 
summarized by Wirtz (2001), “we know high-tech is important in today's economy, but don't 
ask us how we know. Please.” 
This paper took a bold step into this murky world of high-tech. It empirically examined the 
impacts of frontier research on high-tech manufacturing value-added, as well as the 
differential effects between the academic and industry segments. The lack of precise 
measures for high-tech research input presents one of the biggest hurdles. Standard R&D 
expenditure is too general to capture the input in high-tech research. To overcome that hurdle, 
this paper proposes an innovative measure of frontier research investment – the 
supercomputer capacity. 
The empirical findings in this paper demonstrated that SCC is a good proxy for high-tech 
research input in that it is useful to explain both within and between countries variation in 
high-tech manufacturing value-added. It was also found that the composition of high-tech 
research also has an impact on high-tech manufacturing value-added growth. Academic 
research was shown to have a bigger growth effect on the high-tech manufacturing sector 
than industrial research. 
Without doubt, SCC remains a very partial estimate of frontier research input. As such, we 
consider the current paper as an explorative study and aim to use it to highlight both 
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Figure 1- Sectoral shares of Top500 supercomputer capacity by country, 1991-2005 
 
 





























































































































































































































































































































Table 1- Regression results for manufacturing value-added growth rate 
 
 1a  1b  1c  1d  1e  1f  1g  1h  1i 












                  
R&D expenditure 
growth 
0.248*** 0.206  0.248***  0.191* -0.129  0.190**  0.195*  -0.099  0.192** 
 (0.067)  (0.193)  (0.067)  (0.097) (0.211)  (0.097)  (0.100)  (0.199)  (0.100) 
Highly-skilled 
labour growth 
-2.157 -1.470  -2.157 -1.915  -1.096  -1.898  -1.889  -0.960  -1.833 
 (2.245)  (2.323)  (2.245)  (2.218) (2.181)  (2.216)  (2.269)  (2.129)  (2.257) 
SCC growth        0.026*  0.025*  0.026*  0.057**  0.068***  0.058*** 





        -0.012**  -0.017***  -0.012** 
             (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                  
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
   0.711      0.340      0.276 
                  
R-squared 0.040      0.058      0.066     
r2_o   0.039  0.040    0.025  0.058    0.036  0.066 
r2_b   0.289  0.294    0.034  0.372    0.069  0.303 
r2_w   0.020  0.019    0.041  0.035    0.055  0.048 
N 431  431  431  395  395  395  395  395  395 
 
Note: All estimations include a constant term and a time trend. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 2 - Sensitivity tests for the baseline model 
 
  2a  2b  2c 2d  2e 2f 2g 
Modification to 
SCC measure 










            
SCC  growth  0.0681***  0.0690***  0.0694*** 0.0642***  0.0689*** 0.0687*** 0.0610*** 
  (0.0226)  (0.0211)  (0.0210) (0.0196)  (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0207) 
SCC growth 
squared 
-0.0167***  -0.0169*** -0.0170*** -0.0152***  -0.0166*** -0.0164*** -0.0143*** 
  (0.0048)  (0.0046)  (0.0046) (0.0042)  (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0050) 
R&D expenditure 
growth 
-0.0959          
  (0.1988)          
Highly-skilled 
labour growth 
  -0.9387        
    (2.1153)        
            
r2_o  0.035  0.054  0.051 0.051  0.051 0.052 0.050 
r2_b  0.100  0.026  0.011 0.007  0.009 0.011 0.031 
r2_w  0.054  0.057  0.057 0.057  0.057 0.057 0.053 
N  395  411  411 411  411 411 410 
Note: As above. 
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Table 3 - Regression results with segment share of supercomputer capacity 
  3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 3g 3h 3i 
SCC  growth  0.066*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
SCC growth 
squared 
-0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Academic  0.091**          
  (0.037)          
Research    0.021         
    (0.040)         
Industry     -0.093*        
     (0.046)        
Vendor      -0.100***      
      (0.037)       
Classified       -0.202      
       (0.193)      
Government        -0.191     
        (0.120)     
Academic + 
research 
       0.104**    
         (0.043)    
Industry + 
vendor 
        -0.101**   
          (0.045)   
Classified + 
government 
         -0.221 
           (0.158) 
r2_o  0.056 0.049 0.049 0.056 0.054 0.052 0.055 0.053 0.055 
r2_b  0.006 0.003 0.000 0.036 0.015 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.010 
r2_w  0.081 0.057 0.080 0.059 0.060 0.058 0.088 0.084 0.062 
N  411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
Note: As above. 
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Table 4 - Regression results with ratios of segment shares of supercomputer capacity 
 
  4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 
SCC  growth  0.070*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
SCC growth squared  -0.017*** -0.017***  -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Academic/industry  0.056**       
  (0.023)       
(Academic+research)/industry    0.049**      
    (0.023)      
Academic/(industry+vendor)     0.056***     
     (0.022)     
(Academic+research)/(industry+vendor)       0.050**    
       (0.022)    
(Academic+research)/(classified+government)      0.105   
       (0.078)   
(Industry+vendor)/(classified+government)        0.055 
        (0.080) 
Sum of remaining segments’ shares  -0.001  -0.112*  0.012  -0.159  0.005  0.154* 
  (0.041) (0.059) (0.046) (0.156) (0.088) (0.081) 
        
r2_o  0.055 0.059 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.058 
r2_b  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
r2_w  0.085 0.089 0.087 0.089 0.089 0.089 
N  411 411 411 411 411 411 
Note: As above. 
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Table 5 - Regression results with export growth of high-tech manufacturing as the dependent variable 
 





5d 5e 5f 5g 
SCC growth  0.056***  0.127*  0.108*  0.134**  0.132**  0.132**  0.132** 
  (0.016)  (0.063)  (0.059) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
SCC growth squared  -0.015*** -0.031**  -0.023*  -0.032**  -0.032**  -0.032** -0.032** 
  (0.004)  (0.015)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
R&D expenditure growth  -0.899***            
  (0.296)         
Highly-skilled labour growth  -1.482             
  (3.113)         
Academic/industry       0.055***      
       (0.018)      
(Academic+research)/(industry+vendor)       0.061***     
         (0.021)     
(Academic+research)/ 
(classified+government) 
        0.063   
          (0.060)   
(Industry+vendor)/ 
(classified+government) 
         0.003 
           (0.068) 
Sum of remaining segments’ shares        0.090  -0.066  -0.058  0.124** 
       (0.063)  (0.126)  (0.080)  (0.059) 
Hausman test (p-value)      0.720         
           
r2_o  0.001  0.010  0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 
r2_b  0.117  0.001  0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 
r2_w  0.088  0.012  0.011 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
N  341  355  355 355 355 355 355 
Note: As above. 
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Appendix - Country list 
 
Australia Finland  Mexico South  Africa 
Austria France  Netherlands  Spain 
Belgium Germany  Norway  Sweden 
Brazil Israel  Poland  Switzerland 
Canada Italy  Russia  Taiwan 
China Japan Saudi  Arabia United  Kingdom 
Denmark  Korea, South  Singapore  United States 
 
 